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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
---------------------------------------------------------------
JULIE M. CHILD 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
-vs-
THE BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, 
Defendant-
Respondent, 
) 
Case No. 18169 
) 
---------------------------------------------------------------
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
INTRODUCTION 
This is a review of a decision of the Board of Review 
of the Industrial Commission of Utah, finding, pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated (1953) ~ 35-4-S(a), that plaintiff voluntarily 
left work without good cause. Both appellant's and respondent's 
briefs have been previously filed with the court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant outlined the facts in her brief and the 
respondent agreed with those facts in its brief. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
DEFENDANT'S POLICY WHICH PROVIDES THAT LEAVING 
WORK TO ATTEND SCHOOL IS NOT GOOD CAUSE FOR 
VOLUNTARILY TERMINATING EMPLOYMENT SHOULD NO!' 
BE EXTENDED TO A CLAIMANT WHO LEAVES WORK TO 
ACCOMPANY A SPOUSE TO ANOI'HER AREA IN ORDER 
FOR THE SPOUSE TO ATTEND SCHOOL. 
The defendant, at page 5 of its brief, submits that 
"The policy of the State that leaving work to attend school is 
not good cause should be extended to the claimant who leaves 
work to accompany his/her spouse in order for the spouse to 
attend school." It is true, as the defendant submits, that 
voluntarily quitting work to attend school is not good cause. 
The Court in Townsend v. Board of Review, 493 P.2d 614 (Ut. 1972) 
explained the rationale for such a determination: 
To assure that only individuals, who are 
unemployed because of lack of suitable job 
opportunities, receive benefits, this state 
requires that one must be available for work. 
The Employment Security Act was designed to 
check and ameliorate the effects of unemploy-
ment among workers who are able, willing and 
ready to work. The legislature has deemed a 
person in attendance at an established school 
as an individual not available to work ••• 
The rationale of this case, and the others cited by the defendant 
in his brief at page 5, is not that quitting itself is disqualify-
ing but rather the fact that a claimant is not available for full-
time work. (See Utah Code Annotated (1953) § 35-4-5 (g)). 
Therefore, because a person who is enrolled in school is 
not available for full-time work he is not deemed to be unemployed 
due to a lack of suitable job opportunities. This reasoning cannot 
be applied to a claimant who quits to accompany a spouse who attend 
school in an area which requires a move because that claimant maY 
in fact be available for full-time work and not restricted bv a 
-2- ..:·· 
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school schedule. The policy of denying benefits to a person who 
voluntarily terminates employment to attend school is distinct 
from the policy for determining whether a claimant terminated 
his employment for good cause because of compelling external 
pressures. Stated simply, the defendant's policy of denying 
benefits to one who voluntarily terminates his employment to 
attend school can only be applied when the claimant is the one 
who quit to attend school. As in the case at bar, school is 
only g factor to be considered in determining whether a claimant's 
reasons for terminating employment were reasonable and compelling 
and not the detennining factor as the defendant submits. Any 
other determination would work unjust results. 
Defendant states at page 5 of its brief that plaintiff 
cited no cases which allowed benefits to a claimant who terminated 
employment to accompany a spouse to a new area where the spouse 
was attending school. However, at page 10 of her brief plaintiff 
cited the case of Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Com. v. Dept. of 
Labor and Employment, 559 P.2d 252 (Col. App. 1976) in which the 
court affirmed an award of benefits to a claimant who terminated 
her employment to accompany her husband who was attending college 
in another state. In that case the claimant took a leave of 
absence to accompany her husband out of state where he was attend-
ing school. The leave was granted without a guarantee of re-
employment while a transfer by the employer to the new area was 
pending. The transfer did not materialize and the claimant ob-
tained other employment which only lasted for 19 weeks. When 
that employment terminated the claimant filed for unemployment 
compensation. The commission granted benefits under a special 
award section of the statute that allowed benefits to a claimant 
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
who separated from her employment in order to fulfill a marital 
obligation. The issue in that case was whether an employee en-
joying a "leave of absence" should be eligible for unemployment 
compensation. However, in addressing that issue the court affirm 
the commission's findings that the claimant left her employment 
under a condition of marital obligation and cited Briggs v. 
Industrial Commission, 539 P.2d 1303 (Colo. App. 1975). The 
treatment of the Colorado statute which Briggs interpreted is 
discussed in Appellant's brief at pages 9 and 10. The reasoning 
used in Briggs is still viable and plaintiff urges that this court 
adopt it. 
POINT II. 
DEFENDANT'S CONTENTION THAT PLAINTIFF'S VOLUNTARY 
TERMINATION FROM HER EMPLoYMENT WAS NOT CAUSED BY 
EXTERNAL COMPELLING PRESSURES IS UNFOUNDED AND Nor 
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
Defendant submits at page 6 of its brief that personal 
compelling circumstances for voluntarily terminating employment 
must be outside of the control of the claimant and her spouse. 
It is the defendant's contention that if the claimant's unemploy-
ment results from a volitional act of her spouse which is not 
good cause under the Act, good cause cannot be found to exist 
for the claimant's termination. 
It is repugnant to the purpose of the Act to penalize a 
claimant for circumstances that are not within her control. The 
defendant must look to the reasonableness of plaintiff's acts and 
not those of her spouse. Certainly the contrary would not be 
true. That is, if a non-claimant spouse voluntarily left work 
under circumstances that would constitute good cause under the 
·Act and the claimant's spouse voluntarily left work to accompany 
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the spouse to a different area under circumstances that would 
not constitute good cause under the Act the defendant would not 
award benefits to the claimant's spouse. This would be true since 
the non-claimant spouse left work with good cause. 
The defendant cites a portion of Bliley Electric co. v. 
Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 158 Pa. Super. 548, 
45A 2d 898, 903 (1946~ at pages 6 and 7 of its brief,that stands 
for the proposition that the circumstances in each individual 
case must be evaluated to detennine the strength and effect of 
the compulsive pressure to determine whether they are relevant 
and controlling. Yet, the defendant urges the adoption of a 
holding that would categorically deny benefits to a claimant who 
quit to accompany a non-claimant spouse in another locality who 
is attending school. Such a categorical holding ignores the 
individual factors that must be evaluated in each specific case 
contrary to the holding in Bliley. Further, defendant cites no 
authority for its proposition. 
POINT III. 
DEFENDANT'S CONTENTION THAT CLAIMANT'S ACTS WERE 
NOT REASONABLE IS UNFOUNDED AND NOT SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
The defendant concedes, as he must, that plaintiff 
evidenced a genuine attachment to the labor market. However, 
in its brief at pages 8 and 9, defendant submits that plaintiff's 
decision to leave work was not reasonable. The defendant states 
thats "Obviously, alternatives were available to the claimant 
other than quitting her work on August 14, 1981. Such alternatives 
coUld have included a search for work in California during a 
vacation period or with leave of absence from her Utah employer 
-5-
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prior to her terminating her employment and moving to California," 
such a proposition ignores the practical realities of plaintiff's 
circumstances. Plaintiff and her spouse would be forced to main-
tain separate residences, and incur exorbitant traveling expense in 
attempting to locate employment in California. Such a situation 
would hardly promote the integrity of the family unit. 
Realistically, plaintiff had no alternative available to 
her and in order to preserve the marital relationship she was 
forced to terminate her employment in Utah and accompany her 
spouse to California. (See Brief of Appellant, p. 9.) 
As outlined in Point II of her brief, plaintiff submits 
it would be contrary to equity and good conscience to impose a 
disqualification against her as provided by Utah Code Annotated 
(1953) § 35-4-5 (a). However, the defendant argues that if the 
plaintiff is unable to establish that her leaving was for good 
cause then her actions were unreasonable thereby denying her the 
equitable relief available in Utah Code Annotated (1953) § 35-
4-5 (a). Such an interpretation would deny this equitable relief 
in every situation where a claimant was not eligible under the 
statute. That is certainly not the purpose of the statute. 
Plaintiff submits that the equityand good conscience provision of 
Utah Code Annotated (1953) ~ 35-4-5 (a), is to prevent unjust 
results that would otherwise occur by strictly applying the statute. 
Such an interpretation is supported by the defendant's own regula-
tions (Utah Department of Employment Security, General Rules of 
Adjudication at VOLUNTARY LEAVING ~ 210, as cited in Appellant's 
brief at pages 12-13.) 
Wherefore, plaintiff submits that her actions were reason-
able and even assuming arguendo that sh~ had not established good 
"' 
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cause for leaving her employment it would be against equit y ,ind 
good conscience to find that her actions are disqualify ing undi·r-
the Utah Employment Security Act. 
POINT IV. 
THE RECENT AMENDMENT TO THE ACT PROVIDES NO 
EVIDENCE THAT THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED TO DENY 
BENEFITS TO A CLAIMANT WITH RESPECT TO THE 
QUESTION AND STATUTE HEREIN PRESENTED. 
The defendant at pages 10 and 11 of its brief, submits 
that the recent amendment to Section S(a) of the Act by the 
Utah Legislature evidences legislative intent with respect to 
the question herein provided. It is true that Utah Code Annotated 
(1953) § 35-4-S(a) was amended to provide that: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this 
section, a claimant who has left work voluntarily 
to accompany, follow, or join his or her spouse 
to or in a new locality does so without good 
cause for the purposes of this subsection. 
However, this amendment does not establish the intent of the 
legislature regarding the statute in question in this case, 
as the defendant contends. In fact, the contrary is trueo 
Had the legislative intent of the statute in question been to 
exclude a claimant who left work voluntarily to accompany a spouse 
to a new locality, the amendment would not have been required. 
Plaintiff submits that the amendment to the statute evidences a 
previous intent by the legislature under the statute in question 
to not deny benefits to a claimant who had left work voluntarily 
to accompany a spouse, provided it was in compelling circumstances 
Even if it was not the legislature's specific intent to not deny 
benefits in such a situation their silence must be construed as 
impliedly requiring the same good cause provisions to be applied 
as in any other voluntary termination, in fact, no other inter-
pretat:l.on 1§ possible. Also, the equity and good conscience 
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provision of Utah Code Annotated (1953) § 35-4-5(a) is applicable 
even though good cause does not exist. All the amendment does 
is specify a specific situation which is not good cause, it does 
not limit or eliminate the equity and good conscience provision 
of the statute. That must still be considered. 
Further, the defendant conceeds, as it must, that the 
recent amendment is not applicable in the present case. The 
amendment was not effective until April 1, 1982. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has established that terminating her employment 
for the personally compelling reason of accompanying her husband 
who moved out of the state to attend school was for good cause 
under the Utah Employment Security Act. Defendant's detenninatior 
to the contrary is not supported by substantial evidence and shouJ 
be reversed. In addition, the imposition of a disqualification 
would be contrary to equity and good conscience. The recent 
amendment by the legislature evidences a previous intent not to dE 
benefits to a claimant who voluntarily terminated his/her employ-
ment to accompany a spouse who is attending school in another 
locality. 
DATED this &2._~day of January, 1983, 
Respectfully Submitted, 
~~&AJ 
o Se 
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